Can Norway Be a Role Model for Natural Resource Abundant Countries? Keywords: cross-section models, economic development, natural resources, resource booms

During the 1950-70s Norway had relatively low GDP per capita compared to the OECD average and even more so compared to Denmark and Sweden. During the 1970s there was a significant catch-up in incomes and from the early 1990s a .take-off. in relative income. Norway is currently ranked among the countries with the highest GDP per capita in the world and is at the top according to UNDP.s human development indicator. We argue that this development is related to the growth of the Norwegian petroleum sector, although many studies of economic growth conclude that countries abundant in natural resources are not blessed but cursed by gifts of nature. How has Norway avoided so many of the possible problems that follow in the wake of a natural resource-based development? Nowadays the standard answer to this question is .good institutions. and .clever policies.. In this paper we detail the institutions and policies that may explain the peculiar development success of Norway. There are lessons here that can contribute to policy learning, but only on the provision that the specificities of the .learning. country are understood.

Centralized wage bargaining and the “Celtic Tiger” phenomenon

Drawing on a variety of sources and research methods, this article argues that centralized wage bargaining contributed to the “Celtic Tiger” phenomenon by linking wage increases in the dynamic multinational companies sector to wage and productivity increases in the much more sluggish domestic sector of the economy and, in so doing, considerably increased the competitiveness of foreign multinational companies—a key driver of Irish growth. The article also argues that much-received wisdom about the institutional and organizational preconditions for centralized wage regulation needs to be reconsidered in light of the Irish case. Public sector unions played a pivotal role in initiating and sustaining wage centralization, yet their leadership role did not undermine its effectiveness. Likewise, internal democratic procedures and the absence of wage compression policies, rather than centralized organizational structures, facilitated compliance with centralized wage policies